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Introduction

Rosen’s (1974) theory on hedonic prices and implicit markets has greatly shaped economic thought on workplace injury, illness, and death. The theory characterizes the
structural mechanisms of a class of goods that differ by a vector of objectively measured
characteristics. He shows that, in equilibrium, the relationship between price and quantity of characteristics reflects - and therefore reveals - consumer preferences. The model
has direct implications for workplace safety in the labor market. Workers differ by risk
tolerance, and firms differ by risk-based productivity. In equilibrium, more risk-averse
workers sort into low wage, low risk jobs, and less risk-averse workers sort into high wage,
high risk jobs. Moreover, the wage-risk tradeoff at the margin reveals workers’ value
of statistical life (VSL), defined as the collective compensation required by workers for
exposure to one additional fatality in expectation. Numerous studies estimate the VSL
using observational data on wages and risk, and the estimates are crucial to cost-benefit
analyses involving loss of life.
A critical assumption of hedonic price theory and subsequent studies on the VSL
is that workers have accurate information about occupational fatality risk.1 While studies
suggest that workers accumulate and respond to risk information (Viscusi, 1992; Viscusi
and O’Connor, 1984), these studies do not rule out that misperceptions of risk persist. In
behavioral economics, misperceptions of risk is a bias referred to as nonstandard belief,
and experimental evidence suggests that the bias arises in at least three ways: overconfidence, law of small numbers, and projection bias (DellaVigna, 2009). In the context of
workplace safety, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) focus specifically on cognitive dissonance,
whereby workers select information to confirm desired beliefs.
The first aim of this paper is to incorporate behavioral bias due to nonstandard
beliefs into the economics of workplace safety. The aims are similar to Akerlof and Dickens (1982), who introduce cognitive dissonance into the theory of workplace safety, and
1

The issue of risk perception in VSL studies is discussed in reviews by Blomquist (2004), Kniesner and
Leeth (2014), and Viscusi and Aldy (2003). A recent study by (Johnson, 2020) examines a recent practice
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of issuing press releases regarding violations and
penalties of individual establishments. He finds that publicizing the violations of one establishment
improves regulation compliance and workplace safety of nearby establishments.
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a study by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who introduce behavioral biases into the theory of optimal sin taxes. Section 2 builds upon Rosen’s (1974) theory on hedonic prices
and implicit markets with respect to wages and occupational fatality risk. If agents are
rational, workers sort optimally into employment based on risk aversion, and government policies and regulations that effectively cap employment risk only decrease welfare.
Behavioral agents are introduced to the model by assuming workers systematically underestimate or overestimate risk. As shown, workers who systematically underestimate
risk choose riskier employment than optimal, and workers who systemically overstate
risk choose safer employment than optimal. In both cases, welfare decreases, and government policies and regulations can potentially increase social welfare. Whereas Rosen
(1974) considers exogenous restrictions on choice that only decrease social welfare, this
study shows that an optimal risk ceiling may increase welfare and is endogenous to the
distribution of workers’ risk preferences and behavioral biases.
Section 3 provides new empirical evidence on behavioral biases in occupational
fatality risk. Although anectdotal evidence suggests that workers in dangerous jobs are
often oblivious to the dangers (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), empirical evidence on the
magnitudes remains scant.2 The empirical questions are whether self-reported exposure
to death on the job is correlated with objective rates of occupational fatality risk and,
more specifically, whether the correlation varies by education. Evidence suggests that
education causally improves health (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Lleras-Muney, 2005),
and one possible mechanism is that education increases the efficiency of health production
(Grossman, 1972), including the ability to acquire and understand health information.
If so, more educated workers may better assess occupational fatality risk, which would
increase the correlation between self-reported exposure to death and occupational fatality
risk. The data come from the National Health and Interview Survey (NHIS) of 1985,
which includes a one-time survey supplement in which survey respondents report exposure
2

In an oft-cited study in experimental psychology, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) examine how well individuals judge risk by comparing perceived risk of death to actual risk across various causes, including
fireworks (3 per 108 population), drowning (3,600 per 108 ), and stroke (102,000 per 108 ). They find
that subjects tend to overestimate small frequency events and overstate large frequency events. Moreover, subjects were unable to correct for potential sources of bias - specifically due to imaginability and
memorability - when prompted to avoid them.
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to death on the job. These data are linked to occupation fatality rates according to
a respondent’s reported occupation. Occupation fatality rates are tabulated from the
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS), both from 1992 to 2002. The empirical analysis confirms
the predictions regarding subjective risk, objective risk, and education: while subjective
and objective measures of occupational fatality risk are highly correlated among more
educated workers, the partial correlation is a relatively precise zero among workers with
less than a high school diploma.
Section 4 explores the implications of behavioral bias on the estimation of VSL.
The analysis shows that aggregate measures of risk should only be applied to populations
from which they are derived and that, even if this were the case, VSL estimates may
still be biased downwards if some workers increasingly underestimate risk in high-risk
occupations. Given the empirical evidence, this seems most likely among less educated
workers. In multiple regression, the bias not only reflects that less educated workers
underestimate risk, but also that they account for a disproportionately larger share of
the conditional variance in occupational fatality risk. Based on the empirical evidence
of behavioral bias among less educated workers, population estimates of VSL should be
factored by at least 1.35.
Section 5 explores the implications of behavioral bias on the optimal risk ceiling.
The simulation is based on the assumption that more educated workers have no behavioral
bias in perception of occupational fatality risk, but less educated workers have behavioral
bias. Additionally, risk aversion is assumed constant among less educated workers - so
preferences for risk are homogeneous - but less educated workers are less risk averse
than more educated workers on average. Under reasonable assumptions, the optimal risk
ceiling ranges from 7 to 15 fatalities per 105 workers, which correspond respectively to
the 73.0 to 85.9 percentile of the population distribution of occupational fatality risk.
Section 6 concludes by discussing broader issues related to behavioral bias in
occupational fatality risk and various public and private mechanisms to mitigate bias.
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2
2.1

Theoretical Framework
Rational Agents

This section introduces behavioral agents to Rosen’s (1974) model on hedonic prices,
applied specifically to occupational fatality risk in the labor market. Workers’ expected
utility depends endogenously on wages w and occupational injury risk r and exogenously
on risk aversion η and consumption floor d if injured: : E[u(w, r; η, d)] = (1 − r)u(w) +
ru(d). The slope of the indifference curve at (w, r) is given by
d2 w
(dr)2

dw
dr

=

u(w)−u(d)
(1−r)u′ (w)

> 0, where

> 0. In equilibrium, wage is function of risk w(r), and a worker maximizes utility

at w′ (r) =

u(w(r))−u(d)
.
(1−r∗ )u′ (w(r∗ ))

Firms expected profit depends endogenously on wages w and occupational injury
risk r and exogenously on risk-based productivity µ: E[π(w, r; µ)] = R(r) − w. The slope
of the isoprofit curve at (w, r) is given by

dw
dr

= R′ (r) > 0, where

d2 w
(dr)2

= R′′ (r) < 0. In

equilibrium, wage is function of risk w(r), and a firm maximizes profits at w′ (r) = R′ (r)
In equilibrium,

u(w(r))−u(d)
(1−r∗ )u′ (w(r∗ ))

= R′ (r), and supply equals demand at all combi-

nations of (w, r) (Rosen, 1974). To provide intuition for this equilbrium condition, the
model is simplified by considering two types of workers: high risk-averse workers with
preferences uA and low risk-averse workers with preferences uB . Additionally, firms have
only one type of risk-based productivity, and firm profits are zero in equilibrium assuming
the labor market is competitive. An equilibrium under this scenario is illustrated in the
Figure 1. As shown, workers sort into two types of employment based on wages and risk.
Specifically, more risk-averse workers maximize expected utility at E[uA (w0 , r0 )], and less
risk-averse workers maximize expected utility at E[uB (w1 , r1 )]. Government policies or
regulations that cap risk at rc < r1 only reduces welfare, as E[uB (wc , rc )] < E[uB (w1 , r1 )].

2.2

Behavioral Agents

Behavioral biases may arise if a worker’s subjective perception of injury risk differs from
objective injury risk. In Figure 1, for example, suppose more risk-averse workers A
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perceive risk to be r0 for all employment between r0 and r1 . In this case, such workers
would strictly prefer any employment with w > w0 and risk (r0 , r1 ]. Additionally, firms
will offer any terms of employment as long as profits are non-negative. Based on these two
criteria, feasible terms of employment lie below the isoprofit curve and above w0 between
r0 and r1 . Thus, in the short run, firms can profit by exploiting behavioral biases of
workers. If firm profits are zero in equilibrium, the feasible set of employment terms is
further limited to the isoprofit curve. In these cases, expected utility is strictly lower for
more risk-averse workers who deviate from (w0 , r0 ), as E[uA (w, r)] < E[uA (w0 , r0 )] within
the set [w, r : π = 0, r1 ≥ r > r0 ]. Firms, on the other hand, are indifferent between all
(w, r) combinations along the isoprofit line. Thus, encouraging more risk-averse workers
to settle closer to (w0 , r0 ) would be Pareto improving.
More generally, all workers may systematically overestimate or underestimate
risk. To characterize the effect of the behavioral bias on employment terms and welfare,
denote (w∗ , r∗ ) as the optimal choice with no bias. Noted above, the equilibrium is
characterized by R′ (r∗ ) =

u(w(r∗ ))−u(d)
.
(1−r∗ )u′ (w(r∗ ))

Now suppose that individuals systematically overestimate or undestimate risk,
so that ρ = r + v. The worker now chooses employment by maximizing E[u(w, r; σ, v)] =
(1 − ρ)u(w) + ρu(d), with indifference curves

dw
dr

=

u(w)−u(d)
.
(1−ρ)u′ (w)

If v ̸= 0, then the

worker would not choose (w∗ , r∗ ). Specifically, if v > 0, then R′ (r∗ ) <

u(w(r∗ ))−u(d)
,
(1−(r∗ +v))u′ (w(r∗ ))

and the worker would instead seek safer employment r∗∗ < r∗ such that R′ (r∗∗ ) =
u(w(r∗∗ ))−u(d)
.
(1−(r∗∗ +v))u′ (w(r∗∗ ))

Conversely, if v < 0, the worker would seek more dangerous em-

ployment r∗∗ > r∗ . In both cases, E[u(w∗∗ , r∗∗ )] < E[u(w∗ , r∗ )], so behavioral biases
reduce worker welfare regardless of whether they overestimate or underestimate risk.

2.3

Optimal Policy

The presence of behavioral agents may justify government policy and regulation that
restrict risk. First, government maximizes a social welfare function that places equal
weight on all workers:

5

EF [u(w∗∗ , r∗∗ ; σ, v)] = EF [(1 − r∗∗ )u(w∗∗ ) + r∗∗ u(d)].

(1)

Expectations are integrated across the joint distribution of σ and v, denoted F (σ, v). In
this framework, the government maximizes utility absent behavioral bias (r), whereas
the optimal choice of employment by workers (w∗∗ , r∗∗ ) reflects behavioral bias (ρ). Indirect utility is maximized when (w∗∗ , r∗∗ ) equals (w∗ , r∗ ), so the government’s objective
amounts to minimizing the distortion in employment choice that results from behavioral bias (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006). The government’s objective is complicated by
the fact that some workers can overestimate risk while others can underestimate risk.
Therefore, any policy that restricts workers from choosing (w∗∗ , r∗∗ ) potentially increases
welfare of some workers while decreasing welfare of others.
One obvious policy strategy is to improve access and quality of risk information so that workers can make more accurate choices. The US Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), for example, requires many employers with ten or more
employees to keep records of serious work injuries and illnesses and to make these records
available to workers and their representatives. Additionally, the BLS reports work-related
injury and fatality rates annually by industry and occupation. A limitation of these policies to improve welfare is that workers may exhibit small sample bias, whereby risk in
smaller groups is incorrectly inferred from risk in larger groups, or may be optimistic or
pessimistic about their individual risk relative to a group. Moreover, in an experimental study on judging risk, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) find that individuals were unable to
correct for potential sources of bias even when prompted to avoid them.
The government can also consider imposing the costs of workplace injuries on
firms. In the model above, for example, firms could be required to pay for the consumption
floor of injured workers, so profits become R(r) − w(r) − rd, and the slope of the isoprofit
curve becomes R′ (r) − d. While this policy would shift the distribution of objective
risk towards safer employment, it reduces welfare across the entire wage-risk distribution
without addressing welfare losses due to behavioral biases.
A more promising policy strategy to address behavioral bias is to focus on the
6

right tail of the risk distribution, where the share of workers who underestimate risk likely
exceeds the share of workers who overestimate risk. For example, the government could
place a ceiling on objective risk at rc , and enforce the ceiling by establishing workplace
standards and enforcing them through workplace inspections and financial penalties.3 To
evaluate the welfare consequences of a risk ceiling, define a I(r∗∗ > rc ; σ, v) as an indicator
of working at a risk level above rc with a behavioral bias but in the absence of a risk
ceiling. The government chooses rc to maximize a social welfare function

EF [u(w∗∗ , r∗∗ ; σ, v)] = EF [(1−I(rc ))[(1−r∗∗ )u(w∗∗ )+r∗∗ u(d)]+I(rc )[(1−rc )u(w(rc ))+rc u(d)].
(2)
The first-order condition for the the optimal ceiling rc∗ is given by

EF

I(rc∗ )


w

′

(rc∗ )

u(w(rc∗ )) − u(d)
−
(1 − rc∗ )u′ (w(rc∗ ))


= 0.

(3)

At the optimum, there is no welfare gain on the margin among workers who either choose
r∗∗ = rc with behavioral bias or choose r∗ = rc without behavioral bias. In the latter
case, w′ (rc ) =

u(w(rc ))−u(d)
,
(1−rc )u′ (w(rc ))

so the term inside the integral of the first-order condition

is zero. Instead, the welfare effects occur among workers with r∗∗ > rc and r∗ ̸= rc .
If r∗ > rc , then

u(w(rc ))−u(d)
(1−rc )u′ (w(rc ))

< w′ (rc ), so relaxing the ceiling increases social welfare.

If r∗ < rc , then relaxing the constraint decreases social welfare. At the optimum, the
positive marginal welfare effects exactly offset the negative marginal welfare effects, so
the average indifference curve is tangent to the isoprofit curve.
The first-order condition also provides sufficient conditions for any regulatory
ceiling on risk. Denote the maximum employment risk with behavioral biases and in
the absence of a ceiling as rmax . At this point, workers may be overestimating the risk
(r∗ > rmax ), underestimating risk (r∗ < rmax ), or neither (r = rmax ). A sufficient
3

Kniesner and Leeth (2014) discuss and review the literature on the deterrance and abatement effects
of OSHA on workpalce safety. More recently, Levine et al. (2012) and Li and Singleton (2019) find that
workplace inspections improve workplace safety, and Li (2020) finds that penalties improve workplace
safety.

7

condition for a regulatory ceiling is that no worker who chooses the maximum risk also
systematically overstates risk. In this case, the first-order condition would be negative at
rmax , so rc∗ < rmax .

3
3.1

Evidence of Behavioral Biases in Risk Perception
Model and Data

To examine behavioral biases in risk perception, self-reported exposure to death on the
job is compared to objective rates of occupational fatality risk. The partial regression
coefficient between self-reported exposure and objective rates is estimated using the following model:

Deathij = α + βF atalityRateij + γXij + uij .

(4)

The subscripts correspond to individual i in occupation j. Deathi is an indicator of
exposure, equaling one if death is mentioned as an on-the-job risk and zero otherwise.
F atalityRatei is the occupation fatality rate per 100,000 workers. Xij is a vector of
control variables commonly used in the VSL literature (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003): age,
age squared, race (indicator of white), education (indicators of high school diploma and
some college or more, with high school drop as the left-out group), marital status (indicators of married, widowed, and divorced, with never married as the left-out group), and
indicators of veteran status, self-employment, and industry. The term uij is the error.
The coefficient of interest is β, the partial correlation between self-reported exposure and
objective fatality rates. For ease of interpretation, Deathi is factored by 100, so β is
interpreted as percentage points.
To examine whether the correlation differs by education, indicators of education
are interacted with F atalityRatei . This approach assumes the that the effect of the
control variables are constant by education. To relax this assumption, the model is also
estimated separately by education.
8

Data on self-reported exposure come from the NHIS of 1985. This survey year
includes a one-time survey supplement on health promotion and disease prevention that
asks numerous questions about risk exposure. Importantly for this study, the supplement includes questions pertaining to health risks on the job. Survey respondents first
report whether they are exposed to substances or conditions at their present job. If so,
respondents then report which substances or conditions are present and their possible
health effects, including death. The sample is restricted to males at ages 25 to 64 who
are employed at the time of the survey, yielding 8,479 observations.
Objective rates of occupational fatality risk are measured as the number of
fatalities annually per 100,000 workers. Data on the number of deaths come from the
CFOI, which tabulates deaths by occupation annually from 1992 to 2001. Data on the
number of workers comes from the March Supplement of the CPS, survey years 1992 to
2001. Using males only, the fatality rate is calculated as the sum of fatalities from 1992
to 2001, divided by sum of employment and multiplied by 100,000. Fatality rates are
tabulated and merged to NHIS data by 330 standardized occupations codes constructed
by Autor and Dorn (2013), which serves as a crosswalk between the 1980 Census Detailed
Occupation Codes used in the NHIS and the 1990 Census Occupational Classification
System used in the CFOI.4 The sample is further restricted to observations successfully
matched to tabulated fatality rates, yielding 8,229 observations.5
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the analysis sample by education. Demographic characteristics differ by education - for example, age decreases with education
- which will be controlled using multiple regression. Most notable are the differences in
occupation, self-reported exposure to death and accidents on the job, and occupational
fatality rates based on CFOI data. Workers with less than a high school diploma are less
likely to work in professional/technical occupations, and more likely to work in service
and production/operator occupations. Among all workers, reported exposure to death is
substantially lower than exposure to accidents: 4.0 percent versus 51.2 percent. While
4

The CPS also uses the 1990 Census Occupational Classification System.
The sample size decreases by 250 because the occupation code in the NHIS is missing values (64
observations) or does not match to a standardized occupations codes constructed by Autor and Dorn
(2013).
5
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exposure to accidents systematically decreases with education, exposure to death is highest among workers with a high school diploma only and lowest among workers with less
than a high school diploma. In contrast, average occupational fatality is highest among
among workers with less than a high school diploma (12.0) compared to workers with a
high school diploma (8.9) and some college or more (5.0). These results indicate that
self-reported exposure to death is not systematically related to occupational fatality rates
when measured across education groups.

3.2

Results

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between self-reported exposure to death and occupational fatality risk separately by education. To address extreme values of the fatality rate
- with the highest rate reaching 115.0 - the rate is winsorized at 50, which corresponds
to the 99th percentile. The rate is also discretized as integers. The figure shows the
share who report exposure to death by the discretized occupational fatality rate, and the
marker size is proportional to the number of workers within education groups.
The figure reveals three notable patterns. First, among all education groups,
the share of workers who report exposure to death is low at occupational fatality rates
near zero. Thus, workers in low fatality rate occupations do not appear to overestimate
the risk of death. Second, among workers with no high school diploma, the share who
report exposure to death does not increase with the occupational fatality rate. This
suggests that workers with no high school diploma underestimate risk in high fatality
rate occupations.6 Finally, among workers with a high school diploma and some college
or more, the share who report exposure to death increases with the occupational fatality
rate. This suggests that more educated workers appreciate, to some extent, increased
risk of death in high fatality rate occupations.
The regression results from equation (4) are presented in Table 2. The first
column is a regression of self-reported exposure to death on occupational fatality risk.
6

An alternative explanation, which seems unlikely, is that the increase in the occupational fatality
rate is only on the intensive margin, so while the fatality rate increases the share of exposure remains
constant.
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At the mean of 3.96 percent, a one standard deviation in fatality risk of 11.16 increases
the likelihood of self-reported exposure to death by 1.42 percentage points. The second
column interacts the fatality rate with indicators of education and includes education
fixed effects. Consistent with Figure 2, the association between self-reported exposure
to death and occupational fatality risk is mostly evident among more educated workers.
The estimated relationship among workers with no high school diploma is 0.030, which
increases by 0.122 and 0.148 among workers with a high school diploma only and some
college more, respectively. This finding is robust to the including of control variables
(column 3), including industry fixed effects (column 4), estimating the model separately
by education (columns 5 through 7), and the probit and logit models (not shown). In
comparison to more educated workers in columns (6) and (7), the partial correlation for
workers with less than a high school diploma in column (5) is a relatively precise zero.
To explore risk perceptions further, Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between
self-reported exposure to accidents and occupational fatality risk separately by education.
As shown, a substantial share of workers in low fatality rate occupations report exposure
to accidents, and the share is greater among workers with no high school diploma. This
may reflect objective risk, an overestimation of risk, or both. As the occupational fatality
rate increases from zero to approximately 20, the share of workers who report exposure
to accidents increases among all education groups, but appears to increase more steeply
among more educated workers. Beyond 20, the share of workers who report exposure to
accidents remains high for all education groups.
The regression results from equation (4) for exposure to accidents are presented
in Table 3. The results confirm that exposure to accidents is initially greater among
workers with no high school diploma: in column (4), the coefficient on some college or
more is -21.2 percentage points. The results also confirm that the relationship between
exposure to accidents and the occupational fatality rate is greater among more educated
workers: the coefficient on the fatality rate is 0.51 among workers with no high school
diploma and 0.98 among workers with some college or more. Figures 2 and 3 together
suggest that, although workers with no high school diploma perceive high fatality risk
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occupations as more dangerous with respect to accidents, they do not perceive them as
more dangerous with respect to death.

4

Implications for Value of Statistical Life

Behavioral biases in occupational fatality risk have implications for estimating the value of
statistical life. Ideally, the value of statistical life would be estimated using the following
structural model:

s
+ ϵij
wij = α + βrij

(5)

s
is the subThe outcome variable wij is the wage for individual i in occupational j, rij

jective risk of death perceived by the individual worker, and β represents the causal
effect of subjective risk. Blomquist (2004) discusses the preference for subjective risk
over objective risk when estimating VSL.
At least two complications arise when measuring risk. First, a worker’s behavioral bias may result in individual subjective risk differing from individual objective risk,
o
s
o
+ vij ,
denoted rij
. Deviations of subjective and objective risk is characterized by rij
= rij

where vij represents the bias. Second, due to data availability, individual subjective risk
o
o
is often replaced with aggregate objective risk, denoted rjo = fj (r1j
, ..., rN
), where Nj is
j

the number of workers in occupation j.
These two complications yield the following estimable equation:

 o

wij = α + βrjo + β (rij
− rjo )) + vij + ϵij

(6)

The equation highlights two potential sources of bias when estimating β. First, the
o
term (rij
− rjo ) may be positively or negatively correlated with rjo . This is generally

not be an issue if rjo is average risk among the population used for estimation, since
o
(rij
− rjo ) would equal zero in expectation for all rjo . This becomes an issue, however,

if the aggregate measure is used for subgroup analysis, but risk at the subgroup level
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rises more or less steeply with aggregate risk. For example, in Figure 3 on self-reported
exposure to accidents, exposure among less educated workers is initially higher at low
occupational fatality rate occupations, but increases less steeply than average as the
occupational fatality rate increases. This would result in a negative correlation between
o
− rjo ), biasing downward the estimate of β.
rjo and (rij

Second, the behavioral bias vij may be systematically correlated with objective
risk. For example, in Figure 2 on self-reported exposure to death, exposure among less
educated workers does not increase with occupational fatality risk. In this special case,
the correlation between rjo and vij is -1, and the bias in the estimate of β is −β.
The empirical model has two implications for estimating the VSL. First, aggregate measures of risk should should only be applied to populations from which they are
derived. As the empirical model presented here demonstrates, using aggregate measures
for subgroup analysis may lead to overestimating VSL for some groups and underestimating it for others. Second, even if aggregate risk measures are applied to their respective
populations, VSL estimates may still be biased downwards if some workers increasingly
underestimate risk in high-risk occupations.
These issues may account for different VSL estimates between subgroups of
the population. In a review of the VSL literature by Viscusi and Aldy (2003), studies
tend to find larger VSL estimates among workers with higher income. On one hand,
this may reflect that safety is a normal good Viscusi (1978). On the other, this may
reflect that income is highly correlated with education, which has direct effects on the
relationship between wages and risk. As this evidence presented here suggests, objective
safety risk increases more steeply than average risk among more educated workers, and
more educated workers may be more informed about risk compared to less educated
workers. Both factors would lead to higher VSL estimates among higher income workers.
If the nature of behavioral bias is known, one solution is to adjust the estimate
of β upwards, as in Miller (2000) following Lichtenstein et al. (1978). An adjustment
strategy for the bias can be derived from a model of multiple regression with heterogeneous treatment effects (Aronow and Samii, 2016). The model is given by the following
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equation:

Yi = α + βDi + Xi γ + ϵi ,

(7)

where Yi is the outcome variable, and Di is the treatment variable. Utilizing results for
partial regression (Greene, 2008), they show that multiple regression generates a weighted
average of causal effects:

p

β̂ →
−

E[wi τi ]
,
E[wi ]

(8)

where τi is the treatment effect for individual i, and wi = (Di − E[Di |Xi ])2 . Intuitively,
when estimating β in multiple regression with heterogeneous treatment effects, observations are weighted by the conditional variance of Di on Xi .
The question is how to adjust population estimates of VSL assuming that workers with no high school diploma do not perceive differences in occupational fatality risk,
so that among them E[β̂] = 0. On one hand, workers with no high school diploma
represent only 16.6 percent of the population. On the other, these workers account disproportionately for employment in high fatality risk occupations. To quantify the matter,
occupational fatality risk is regressed on the control variables and industry fixed effects
from equation (4):

F atalityRateij = δXij + µij .

(9)

¯2 decreases with education: 0.55 among workers with no high school
As expected, µ̂
ij
diploma, 0.34 among workers with a high school diploma only, and 0.29 among workers
with some college or more. Although workers with no high school diploma represent only
16.6 percent of the population, they account for 26.2 percent of the variation in µ̂2ij .
The share of conditional variance in occupational fatality risk attributable to
behavioral agents is useful for adjusting VSL estimates. For example, if VSL is constant
in the population, but 26.2 percent of the conditional variance is attributable to low
educated workers with E[β̂] = 0, then E[β̂] = 0.74β from a population-level regression.
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In this case, estimates of VSL should be factored by 1.35. If more educated workers also
underestimate risk, the factor would be greater.

5

Implications for Optimal Policy

Behavioral biases in occupational fatality risk also have implications for the optimal risk
ceiling. An example of the optimal risk ceiling is simulated based on several assumptions.
First, worker utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion, u(w) = (w1−η − 1)/(1 − η),
with η as the measure of risk aversion. Second, firm revenues with respect to risk increase
at a decreasing rate, w(r) = arb , where 0 < b < 1. Third, more educated workers
have no behavioral bias in perception of occupational fatality risk, so the distribution
of workers across the wage-risk distribution is due only to risk aversion. Finally, less
educated workers have behavioral bias, so employment choice reflects both risk aversion
and perception bias. To simplify matters, risk aversion is assumed constant among less
educated workers - so preferences for risk are homogeneous - but less educated workers
are less risk averse than more educated workers on average. The latter accounts for the
tendency for lower educated workers to select riskier employment.
The simulation is conducted using the NHIS sample. Low educated workers are
defined as no high school diploma, and more educated workers are defined as at least a
high school diploma. Additionally, the risk space is discretized into integer categories g
so that discretized risk rg = g if continuous risk r satisfies g − 1 < r ≤ g. Discretized risk
rg = 1 for continuous risk between 0 and 1. Based on the data, g spans 41 risk categories
from 1 to 114.
The first step is to calibrate the values of a and b of the revenue function. If
more educated workers are fully informed, then the average marginal revenue product
should equal the VSL. Denote p̃m
g as the conditional share of more educated workers
P
with employment risk g, so g p̃m
g = 1. The equation for VSL is given by the following
equation:
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X

(b−1)
p̃m
= V SL
g abrg

(10)

g

The shares p̃m
g are estimated from the data, and the VSL is set equal to $74. Because
risk is measured per 105 workers, the value of statistical life is $7.4 million, which falls
between the range of $4 and $10 million estimated by Kniesner et al. (2012). The term
a is now an implicit function of b. For this simulation, b = 0.9, so a = 30.
The next step is to determine the distribution of η. In equilibrium, marginal
revenue product equals the indifference curve at each level of risk:

abrg(b−1)

=

wg1−η −1
1−η

d1−η −1
1−η
)w−η

−

(1 − rg

,

(11)

where wg = argb . If consumption when injured d is known, this equation identifies the
value ηg for each risk group g. For this simulation, d is a constant and replaces 75 percent
of wages of the lowest risk group: d = 0.75w1 . Based on the data, η ranges from 54.5 for
g = 1 to 2.56 for g = 114, with a mean of 16.6.
With the distribution of η identified among more educated workers, it is now
possible to calculate the welfare losses among more educated workers due to a risk ceiling.7
Denote the risk ceiling as rc , which corresponds to wage wc = w(rc ), and denote the
population share of more educated workers observed in risk g as pm
g . The social marginal
welfare cost at risk ceiling rc is given by

SM C(rc ) =

X

pgm



abrg(b−1)

rg >rc


u(w(rc , ηg )) − u(d, ηg )
−
.
(1 − rc )u′ (w(rc , ηg ))

(12)

Figure 4 plots the social marginal cost at different values for the risk ceiling, from rc = 1
to rc = 20. The social marginal cost is lowest at rc = 20. This reflects that the share
of more educated workers at or above g = 20 and g = 30 is just 8.5 percent and 2.6
percent of the population, respectively, and that the risk ceiling does not restrict risk
substantially relative to optimal risk. As the risk ceiling is lowered, the social marginal
7

By assumption, more educated workers display no behavioral bias and therefore only lose welfare
due to a risk ceiling.
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cost increases. This reflects that more workers are affected by the ceiling and that the
ceiling restricts risk more substantially relative to optimal risk.
The next step is to determine the social marginal benefit of the risk ceiling.
Stated above, η is assumed constant among less educated workers. Thus, the social
marginal welfare benefit at risk ceiling rc is given by

SM B(rc ) =

X
rg >rc

plg



u(w(rc , η l )) − u(d, η l )
(b−1)
abr
−
,
(1 − rc )u′ (w(rc , η l ))

(13)

where plg is the population share of less educated workers in risk group g, and η l is the
constant level of risk aversion. Figure 4 plots the social marginal benefit at different
values for the risk ceiling rc and risk aversion η l , the latter evaluated at 5.5, 6.5, and 7.5.
These values represent less risk aversion than more educated workers: approximately 70.6
percent of more educated workers are more risk averse than 5.5, and approximately 55.2
percent are more risk averse than 7.5. By definition, the social marginal benefit equals
zero if the socially optimal risk for workers with risk aversion η l is rc . As the rc increases
relative to the socially optimal risk, more workers choose rd between the optimal risk and
the risk ceiling according to plg , which increases the social marginal benefit of the ceiling.
According to equation (3), the optimal risk ceiling occurs where the social
marginal benefit equals social marginal cost. This occurs in Figure 4 where the benefit curves cross. As shown, the optimal risk ceiling depends on the risk aversion of less
educated workers. In the more risk averse scenario (η l = 7.5), the optimal risk ceiling
is approximately 7 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 73.0 percentile of the
risk distribution. In the less risk averse scenario (η l = 5.5), the optimal risk ceiling is
approximately 15 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 85.9 percentile of the risk
distribution.
Figure 4 illustrates the simulation from raising VSL from $74.0 to $98.8, the
upper-bound esetimate from Kniesner et al. (2012). As shown,the optimal risk ceiling
does not change substantially. This reflects that raising the VSL increases both the social
marginal cost and the social marginal benefit across values of rc .
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6

Conclusion

The results from this study contribute to the literature on behavioral economics and its
implications for public policy (Mullainathan et al., 2012; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006).
The empirical results reveal substantial bias among less educated workers, who do not
report greater exposure to death in high fatality rate occupations. Under reasonable
assumptions, government policy can improve social welfare by enforcing a ceiling on
occupational risk.
One strategy to enforce a risk ceiling is through workplace inspections and penalties through OSHA. Before 1999, OSHA targeted “programmed” inspections at industries
with high rates of accidents and injuries; however, many establishments in high-risk industries were found to be relatively safe. In the mid 1990s, OSHA created the Site Specific
Targeting (SST) plan, which first collected injury rates at the establishment level, then
targeted establishments with the highest rates for a programmed inspection. The cutoff
for an inspection corresponded to the 86.3 percentile of the distribution (Li and Singleton,
2019), similar to the risk ceiling in the less risk averse simulation of this study.
Such blanket enforcement of a risk ceiling potentially helps behavioral workers
who underestimate risk, but hurts rational workers who are accurately informed. The
emprical evidence presented here, however, does not rule out the possibility that more
educated workers underestimate risk, especially at the extreme right tail of the risk distribution. Moreoever, workers who underestimate risk may pose a negative externality
on rational workers through added carelessness on the job. In any case, to target behavioral workers, enforcement efforts can focus specifically on high risk industries and
establishments with disproportionate shares of less educated workers and where wages do
not appear commensurate with risk.
An important consideration is whether the negative welfare consequences of
behavioral bias can be addressed privately. Labor unions, for example, may be more
efficient at providing workers with more accurate information about risk (Dickens, 2004;
Olson, 1981; Viscusi, 1979). This may account for the greater VSL estimates among
union workers: in a review of the literature, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) note that nine out
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of ten studies that estimate VSL by union status found that unions workers receive a
greater wage premium for fatality risk. Relatedly, union workers are more likely to have
a non-fatal occupational injury (Donado, 2015), and unionization increases regulatory
enforcement (Sojourner and Yang, 2020) and improves workplace safety (Li et al., 2020).
Finally, workers may collect their own information regarding workplace safety
through repeated transactions, private networks, advertising, and the media. In 2009, for
example, OSHA began issuing press releases on establishments with egregious workplace
safety violations and penalties, which improved workplace safety in nearby establishments (Johnson, 2020). In contrast, informing employers privately that their accident
case rates were above the national average had no effect on workplace safety (Li and
Singleton, 2019). Information may also be improved through quality dislosures and certifications. Dranove and Jin (2010) review the literature on disclosures and certifications
for consumper products. Relatively understudied is the effect of quality disclosures and
certifications on wages and workplace safety.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of NHIS Sample, Males Ages 20 to 64
Less than High School Some College
Education
HS diploma
Diploma
More
Total
Age (years)
44.71
39.45
39.43
40.31
(0.30)
(0.20)
(0.16)
(0.12)
White
81.56
88.53
89.60
87.88
(1.06)
(0.60)
(0.48)
(0.36)
Married
81.32
81.07
77.50
79.40
(1.06)
(0.73)
(0.66)
(0.45)
Self Employed
13.46
11.67
11.21
11.75
(0.93)
(0.60)
(0.50)
(0.35)
Professional/Technical
13.39
29.03
73.16
47.64
(0.93)
(0.85)
(0.70)
(0.55)
Serivce
18.97
12.88
7.83
11.47
(1.07)
(0.63)
(0.42)
(0.35)
Production/Operator
67.64
58.08
19.01
40.89
(1.27)
(0.92)
(0.62)
(0.54)
Death Exposure
3.08
5.19
3.36
3.96
(0.47)
(0.42)
(0.28)
(0.22)
Accident Exposure
60.93
62.72
39.39
51.17
(1.35)
(0.91)
(0.78)
(0.56)
Occupational Fatality Rate
12.03
8.93
5.06
7.59
5
(per 10 workers)
(0.39)
(0.21)
(0.14)
(0.12)
0 to 1.5
13.55
18.91
34.74
25.62
(0.93)
(0.73)
(0.75)
(0.48)
1.5 to 4
6.30
10.51
21.90
15.28
(0.66)
(0.57)
(0.65)
(0.40)
4 and above
80.15
70.58
43.36
59.09
(1.09)
(0.85)
(0.78)
(0.54)
Observations
1,351
2,860
4,018
8,229

The sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males
ages 20 to 64. Occupations are aggregated according to standardized occupations codes
constructed by Autor and Dorn (2013), and occupational fatality rates are constructed
from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of the
Current Population Survey (CPS), both from 1992 to 2002. Estimates are in percentage
points unless otherwise noted. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Linear Probability Model of Death Exposure, Males Ages 20 to 64
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
No HS
HS
Education
All
All
All
All
Diploma Diploma College
Fatality Rate
0.127*** 0.030
0.031
-0.012
-0.006
0.198*** 0.106**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
(0.039)
(0.065) (0.049)
Fatality Rate - HS Diploma
0.122** 0.126** 0.164***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.062)
Fatality Rate - College
0.148** 0.142** 0.138**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
HS Diploma
1.298*
0.689
0.133
(0.785) (0.802) (0.859)
College
0.055
-0.497
-0.818
(0.672) (0.693) (0.765)
Mean Death
Control Variables
Industry Fixed Effects
Observations

3.96
No
No
8229

3.96
No
No
8229

3.96
Yes
No
8229

3.96
Yes
Yes
8229

3.08
Yes
Yes
1351

5.19
Yes
Yes
2860

3.36
Yes
Yes
4018

The outcome variable is an indicator of exposure to death on the job (factored by 100), and the regressor of interest is the occupational
fatality rates, measured per 105 workers. The sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males ages 20
to 64. Occupational fatality rates are constructed from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of
the Current Population Survey (CPS), both from 1992 to 2002. Control variables consist of age, age squared, race, education, marital
status, veteran status, self-employment status. Industry fixed effects are created from 14 industry categories. Robst standard errors are
in parentheses.

Table 3: Linear Probability Model of Accident Exposure, Males Ages 20 to 64
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
No HS
HS
Education
All
All
All
All
Diploma Diploma College
Fatality Rate
0.960*** 0.546***
0.507***
0.452*** 0.511*** 0.792*** 0.976***
(0.057)
(0.089)
(0.087)
(0.085)
Fatality Rate - HS Diploma
0.318**
0.331***
0.294**
(0.127)
(0.124)
(0.117)
Fatality Rate - College
0.845***
0.822***
0.708***
(0.148)
(0.145)
(0.136)
HS Diploma
1.379
-2.895
-2.776
(2.156)
(2.157)
(2.365)
College
-20.680*** -24.637*** -21.210***
(1.982)
(1.983)
(2.277)
Mean Accident
51.17
51.17
51.17
51.17
60.93
62.72
39.39
Control Variables
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
8229
8229
8229
8229
1351
2860
4018

The outcome variable is an indicator of exposure to death on the job (factored by 100), and the regressor of interest is the occupational
fatality rates, measured per 105 workers. The sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males ages 20
to 64. Occupational fatality rates are constructed from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of
the Current Population Survey (CPS), both from 1992 to 2002. Control variables consist of age, age squared, race, education, marital
status, veteran status, self-employment status. Industry fixed effects are created from 14 industry categories. Robst standard errors are
in parentheses.

Wage, w(r)

E[uB(w1,r1)]
E[uA(w0,r0)]

Isoprofit, π

w1
w0

r0

r1

Risk, r

Figure 1: Market Equilibrium with Rational Agents
The figure illustrates the share of self-reported exposure to death on the job (factored by
100) by integer categories of occupational fatality rates, measured per 105 workers. The
sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males ages 20
to 64. Occupational fatality rates are constructed from the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS),
both from 1992 to 2002. The size of the markers are proportional to the number of
workers within education categories.
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Figure 2: Death Exposure by Education and Occupational Fatality Risk, Males 20 to 64
The figure illustrates the share of self-reported exposure to death on the job (factored by
100) by integer categories of occupational fatality rates, measured per 105 workers. The
sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males ages 20
to 64. Occupational fatality rates are constructed from the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS),
both from 1992 to 2002. The size of the markers are proportional to the number of
workers within education categories.
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Figure 3: Accident Exposure by Education and Occupational Fatality Risk, Males 20 to
64
The figure illustrates the share of self-reported exposure to death on the job (factored by
100) by integer categories of occupational fatality rates, measured per 105 workers. The
sample is derived from the National Health Interview Survey, restricted to males ages 20
to 64. Occupational fatality rates are constructed from the Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries (CFOI) and the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS),
both from 1992 to 2002. The size of the markers are proportional to the number of
workers within education categories.
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Figure 4: Simulation of Optimal Risk Ceiling, VSL=$7.4 million
The figure illustrates the optimal ceiling on occupational fatality risk measured per 105
workers, which occurs where where social marginal cost equals social marginal benefit.
The social marginal cost occurs among more educated workers who, by assumption, have
no behavioral bias. The social marginal benefit occurs among less educated workers
who do have behavioral bias. Risk aversion η among the latter is assumed constant,
and the simulation considers three values: 5.5, 6.5, and 7.5. Value of statistical life is
assumed $7.4 million. In the more risk averse scenario (η l = 7.5), the optimal risk ceiling
is approximately 7 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 73.0 percentile of the
risk distribution. In the less risk averse scenario (η l = 5.5), the optimal risk ceiling is
approximately 15 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 85.9 percentile of the risk
distribution.
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Figure 5: Simulation of Optimal Risk Ceiling, VSL=$10.0 million
The figure illustrates the optimal ceiling on occupational fatality risk measured per 105
workers, which occurs where where social marginal cost equals social marginal benefit.
The social marginal cost occurs among more educated workers who, by assumption, have
no behavioral bias. The social marginal benefit occurs among less educated workers who
do have behavioral bias. Risk aversion η among the latter is assumed constant, and the
simulation considers three values: 5.5, 6.5, and 7.5. Value of statistical life is assumed
$10.0 million. In the more risk averse scenario (η l = 7.5), the optimal risk ceiling is
approximately 7 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 73.0 percentile of the
risk distribution. In the less risk averse scenario (η l = 5.5), the optimal risk ceiling is
approximately 15 per 108 population, which corresponds to the 85.9 percentile of the risk
distribution.
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